AFFECT: Towards a Theology of Experience

Graham Ward

A CHANGE OF HEART

In turn I'm going to be Biblical, philosophical (though theological in orientation), and biological or more specifically neurophysiological. This is not a polished piece of research but an improvisation and a gamble that may not amount to anything. But let me try something and then get your response. In the time I have I can't go into all the details of the conjunctions I want to make, but the methodology is one that might be called an engaged systematic theology. And I can say more about that project later. In this paper I'm concerned primarily with two interrelated theological issues: sanctification and the formation of the soul—that is, the soul's embodiment, its sentient life, its inner reflective life and the environment in which it dwells. For the formation or rather transformation or even transubstantiation of the soul is what salvation and discipleship is all about. With every encounter with the world in which it dwells, the embodied soul is continually undergoing some process or another, some dilation or contraction, some inflexion or hardening, some present learning that will fashion its future. I'm going to switch from Greek to Hebrew now, because if I continue with the Greek "soul" (ψυχή) then I will always have adjectivally to predicate "embodied" in order to avoid any possibility of dualism.
The Hebrew “heart” (lev) bears no such difficulty.\(^1\) It is the seat of the emotions and as such it is sentient; it is a name of one of the most important of our corporeal organs or viscera; and it also the place where thinking, believing, imagining and memory takes place. It faces both the external and the internal worlds of the body; it both embraces the conscious and the unconscious for there are things hidden in the heart that only God can draw forth. And so with the “heart” we turn to two Scriptures. I’m going to use the Authorised Version for its resonance and in honour of its four hundredth anniversary this year (2011).

The first is from Ezekiel: “A new heart also I will give you and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgements, and do them.”\(^2\) This is the great promise of God’s redemption. The spirit is ruach—breath, life—and it animates the heart in ways that lead from feelings and thoughts to acts: walking in God’s statutes, keeping God’s judgements. The promise here is the acknowledgement of a divine desire understood in Psalm 51.5: “thou desirest truth in the inward parts; and in the hidden part thou shalt make me to know wisdom.” But even in this acknowledgement there lies a recognition that what God desires so God will perform: “thou shalt make me to know.” How are we made to know? And how are we given a new heart of flesh? It is not, I contend, by divine fiat; rather it is by a divine working within us that discipleship inaugurates; that transformation or even transubstantiation of the heart of stone.

My second Scripture is from Matthew’s Gospel, and Jesus is speaking: “whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught? But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile a man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, and blasphemies: these are

\(^1\) There has been much debate since the end of the Second World War about the virtues of the Hebrew nephesh which the LXX translates as psuchē. Nephesh, it is said is holistic rather than dualistic. For advocates of this understanding of nephesh, see Johnson, The One and the Many, 4,7,33. But not Biblical scholars are convinced. For the counter argument see Barr, The Garden of Eden, 32-44. Barr also give an interesting contextualisation for a shift in Biblical hermeneutics away from Hellenistic readings to Jewish readings.

\(^2\) Ezek 36:26-27.
the things which defile a man.”³ Here is a portrait of the stony heart: whose thinking, speaking, doing and feeling are all ordered towards what Augustine, creating two (im)moral categories, calls the libido dominandi and the amor sui. It is not the heart as such which is evil, for as Jesus says elsewhere in Matthew it is the source of what is most valuable to you—“where your treasure is there will your heart be also”⁴ and from it may also flow forgiveness:⁵ “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”.⁶ If it is not the heart as such which is wrong then it is the disposition of the heart; that is, the ordering of its feeling, knowing and doing. So if redemption is the work of grace which transforms or transubstantiates the heart then we should expect, as the law of God is written upon our inner parts, that our sentient and emotional life, our cognitive life and the involvement of both in our behaviour (and that behaviour again upon our sentient and cognitive life) will be changed.

SANCTIFICATION AND THEOLOGIES OF EXPERIENCE

To be transformed into His likeness—to be transubstantiated—requires an inner working of His Spirit: our sanctification.⁷ This inner working cannot just take place at the level of knowing and doing. There are those who may know, intellectually, an awful lot about God, what has been transcribed of His work in the Scriptures, the history of the interpretation of those Scriptures, and the traditions of those who worship Him; there are people who can speak words of eloquent piety; and there are those who can act in accordance with the teachings of the tradition, its ritual laws of purity, for example. But such people

³ Matt 15:17-20.
⁴ Matt 6:21
⁵ Matt: 18:35
⁶ Matt: 5:8
⁷ What I am not treating here is what one might call the “other side” of the operation – that treated in a doctrine of the atonement. In a purely heuristic fashion (because the relationship between the two economies are profoundly intertwined), we could call the sanctification process the human and ecclesial side of the atonement, which is a more objective operation between God the Father and God the Son. We enter into the effects of the reconciliation Christ’s death and resurrection performs. Because of the intra-divine nature of this second economy, we cannot approach this phenomenologically. We can only treat the outworking in and through the Spirit in terms of personal and collective sanctification.
may not know, intimately, as in marriage a man knows his wife—in the inner working of sanctification. Jesus himself draws attention to the hypocrisies of the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Temple Scribes in his own day; and any one of us who preaches recognises that pious words are cheap and altruistic acts can often be done out of duty or fear of social stigma or a sense of moral righteousness. To be transformed then, to be turned into imitators of Christ and embody His real presence, hence our transubstantiation, is a more profound work that goes on at the level of the affections not just knowledge; affections which can never be disassociated from our corporeality, our cognitions and our embodied acts. At the basis of the “murders, adulteries fornications, thefts, false witness, [and] blasphemies” of which Jesus speaks lies a set of emotions: hatred, anger, lust, covetousness, jealousy; emotions which are prior to acts and prior sometimes even to what theories of the emotions call the “appreciation” of the emotion, that turns them into conscious feelings. More of that anon. It is then not just what proceeds from the heart but the heart itself that needs to be transformed. It is in the realms of our pre- or unconscious, it is in the spheres that are prior to our will to act, that the labour of sanctification must work. And this labour is not accomplished in a moment, even a moment of conversion or revelation; it has to be accomplished over a lifetime of attunement and turning. Discipleship is a learning process; a venture into an ongoing metanoia, repentance and confession. Such a discipleship will not just impact our ethics, and the ethoi that such an ethics creates; nor will it just impact our understanding. To impact our affections it has to penetrate into our emotional life; and our emotional life, as we will see, is intimately connected with our biologies and physiologies. It is a “heart of flesh” that is to be formed from a “heart of stone.” And if we take these phrases, and the additional description of the “hardening of the heart” that comes from unrepentence and stubborn persistence in doing things one’s own way and for one’s own gratification, as only metaphors then we miss the profundity of what incarnation means. The change of disposition that sanctification performs is a work of the Spirit exploring the hidden depths of the human heart. Such an exploration awakens us to our own inner motivations, revealing to us inmost secrets and emotional stirrings (perhaps aspects of

8 To so-named ‘seven deadly sins’ are, as Augustine understood, disorders of love. They—envy, vainglory, sloth, avarice, anger, gluttony, lust—also name profoundly affective states.
ourselves and our experience we repress the acknowledgement of or psychologically forget). In this way the Spirit sanctifies the heart. It is a work of grace to which we have to give access and acceptance; from which we have to take heed and learn. Things hidden have to be brought to confession. This is the learning that discipleship inaugurates. It is a learning about ourselves, the human condition and the world around us.

“[I]nteriority does not close off the world but allows the world to penetrate us more deeply.” For in exploring the hidden depths of our being the Spirit is at work in and through and beyond us – in the churches to which we belong and the world in which we dwell. But we can hinder the work of the Spirit—if only for a time—through that self-assertion which “hardens” the heart and turns it to stone. The hardening is literal. We know how our emotional and intellectual life impacts the autonomic nervous system which governs our heart beat, blood pressure, muscle tone, breathing, bowel movements, perspiration and adrenalin glands releasing stress hormones into the bloodstream. Stress—which ‘hardening’ indicates—has physiological affects; just as the release from stress (experiencing that peace which the world cannot give) also has physiological affects. Radical incarnation—which involves the Spirit of Christ living in us and bringing about our sanctification and the sanctification of the world—operates at the level of our somatic, emotional and cognitive experience. “Hearts of stone”, “hearts of flesh”, and “hardening of the heart” are then as much physiological descriptions as accounts of moral dispositions. In his laconic notes for a lecture course on the phenomenology of Christian Mediaeval mysticism of 1918-19 (a course he never actually gave), Heidegger makes some astute observations about Christianity and experience. He begins by pointing out that the “power”, “grace” and “wrath” of God are all “experiential effects.” With mysticism we perceive the “emergence of a new motivational complex in the experiencing subject.” In fact, it is not simply that Christians like all other human beings are experiential creatures, there is also that in Christianity which motivates the Christian to seek experience—an experience of God in a relationship of love and worship towards Him. There is a “[r]eligious longing for experience and give effort towards the

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9 Wright, ‘Edith Stein’, 139.


presence of Jesus is possible as genuine only as a growing out of a basic experience. Such experiences are not freely and deliberately at one's disposal in the observance of the rules of church law. 'Knowledge' about these experiences and their essence rises only in actual having-experienced." As such, there needs to be then, in a way that does justice to the "full facticity" of the concrete historical context, a theology of experience quite at odds with any suprahistorical and Universalist account of religious experience per se.13

Now a much shortened theological section: in sanctification, we are not talking about some abstract ethereal process but a concrete operation of affect: something we experience even if it is something we cannot, ourselves, calculate and measure. So let us turn to two quite similar and specifically Christian accounts of experience, the first by Schleiermacher and the other by Hegel.

Both Schleiermacher and Hegel understood that the origins of the theological and the ethical lie with ‘feeling’ and ‘intuition’. By feeling and its relation to intuition neither of these thinkers, from whom we have much to learn and much to appreciate, are primarily referring to something occult, paranormal, or clairvoyant. Although they are moments in Schleiermacher’s early, more Romantic work, when his living “intuition of the universe”14 is related to a certain, and idiosyncratically understood, mysticism. But primarily, Schleiermacher and Hegel speak of feeling (Gefühl) and intuition (Anschauung) from their deep, if eventually highly critical, reading of Kant. It must be emphasised that while there might be some debates about the term’s meaning in Hegel, for Schleiermacher Gefühl is not reducible to Sinneseindruck (sense impression) or Empfindung (sentience). Together with Anschauung it bears a close resemblance to Stimmung or attunement.15 For Kant, Gefühl and

12 Heidegger, Phenomenology of Religious Life, 252.
13 Heidegger, Phenomenology of Religious Life, 183.
14 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 104. In the two subsequent editions of 1806 and 1821 the language of the ‘universe’ is toned down because of contemporary critics reading pantheism into such a view.
15 Recognising the affinity of ‘feeling’ and ‘intuition’ with ‘attunement’ fits with a twofold emphasis in Schleiermacher’s thought, over against Kant’s. First, Schleiermacher’s concern with ontological participation and not just epistemology that goes as far back as his 1789 essay “Über das höchste Gut” which ends on the observation that the “moral sense” [moralisches Sinnes] or ‘moral feeling’ [moralischen Gefühl] derives from [abgeleitet] and is related to [bezieht sich auf] the moral law (all instances of which constitute the highest good).
Anschauung are terms related to the primary reception of the manifold (what he calls the Ding an sich), which for him is ultimately unknowable.\textsuperscript{16} It is unknowable because all our immediate perceptions of it are mediated through our consciousness: first, our faculty of the imagination, then our faculty of understanding, and finally our faculty of reasoning. We only know the Ding an sich as it becomes conceptualised, spatialized and temporalized; that is, as it enters the realm of phenomena. In and of itself, for Kant, it belongs to the realm of the noumenal. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel were famously sceptical, indeed scathing, about the Kant’s bifurcation of human existence between the noumenal and the phenomenological.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, they took the concept of intuition from him and what was most important about intuition for both of them was Kant’s claim that “intuition takes place only in the object so far as it is given to us.”\textsuperscript{18} This understanding of perception as reception is the basis for Schleiermacher’s concept of religion and later piety: “what you thus intuit and perceive is not the nature of things, but their action upon you”\textsuperscript{19}. Let us also note that Anschauung can also mean “contemplation.” This meaning is more justifiable when treating Schleiermacher because Schleiermacher was profoundly influenced by Plato (who he spent most of his working life translating). “Intuition” then would relate not to just immediate (or better a primordial preconsciousness) perception, but also to that to which the perception gives rise: theoria or contemplation. For Hegel intuition is the “perceptible particular”, but as Georg Lasson, who edited Hegel’s manuscript System der Sittlichkeit in 1913, wrote in his Introduction, this was part of Hegel’s understanding of actuality as “the totality of life which brings all moments of life together…This actuality… is a givenness.”\textsuperscript{20} Both Schleiermacher and Hegel are concerned with the sheer

\textsuperscript{16} Famously in Critique of Pure Reason, A19: “In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them and to which all thought as a means is directed.”

\textsuperscript{17} For Schleiermacher see his 1793-4 long unpublished essay “Über die Freiheit”. For Hegel, see his 1802-3 published long essay “Gluten und Wisent.”

\textsuperscript{18} Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19.

\textsuperscript{19} Schleiermacher, On Religion, 104-5.

\textsuperscript{20} Quoted in Hegel, Ethical Life, 100.
givenness of life that feeling and intuition access and from it, for both, issues ethical life. Both thinkers frame their thoughts within a Christian theology and are treating here our situatedness within this givenness of all things, which for Schleiermacher is infinite, and for Hegel (who doesn’t care for the language of the early Romantics) is absolute.\(^{21}\) Hegel: “Thus… ethical life is also an unveiling, an emergence of the universal in the face of the particular… This intuition, wholly immersed in the singular, is feeling.” \(^{22}\) We are then “wholly immersed”. Schleiermacher is more effusive:

> The universe exists is uninterrupted activity and reveals itself at every moment. Every form that it brings forth, every being to which it gives a separate existence according to the fullness of life, every occurrence that spills forth from its rich, ever-fruitful womb, is an action of the same upon us… [T]he drive to intuit, if it is oriented to the infinite, places the mind in unlimited freedom… [E]very intuition is, by its nature, connected with feeling. Your senses mediate the connection between the object and yourselves; the same influence of the object, which reveals its existence to you, must stimulate them in various ways and produce a change in your inner consciousness. This feeling, of which you are frequently scarcely aware, can in other cases grow to such intensity… your whole nervous system can be so permeated by it that for a long time that sensation alone dominates and resounds and resists the effect of other impressions."\(^{23}\)

Schleiermacher engages the mystical when he approaches his notion of “unlimited freedom.” What is evident though from what I have already presented is that for both Hegel and Schleiermacher, the body is the source whereby we create our personal world which generates much of the meaning we make out of our experience of the world that is worlded (by others past and present as well as ourselves). Both expressly affirmed the inseparability of the body and the soul in a more or less Aristotelian manner. If the soul is the form of the body for Aristotle then Hegel speaks of the soul framing the body directly so that one can

\(^{21}\) The exception to this is in his 1802 *System der Sittlichkeit*, where he employs many of the terms Schleiermacher himself used, terms that later he avoided. Perhaps we should read this early text as answering Schleiermacher’s 1799 *On Religion*, which was very popular at the time – although there is no mention of Schleiermacher in the text. There is a critique of Schleiermacher’s book in his important 1802 publication “Faith and Knowledge”.

\(^{22}\) Hegel, *Ethical Life*, 103.

“neither be supposed nor conceived without the other”\textsuperscript{24} and Schleiermacher admits we cannot really attain an “idea of finite spiritual life apart from that of a bodily organism.”\textsuperscript{25} But prior to the worlding of the world that takes place through the mental representation and communication of which human beings are capable there is that nakedness of immersion or permeation itself in the face of the given. If Schleiermacher finds the origin of religion in this primordial feeling, which later he will define in terms of the feeling of absolute dependence and Hegel, in 1802, will describe as “a universal physical dependence on one another.”\textsuperscript{26} I want to maintain the sense of exposure it brings before it produces a change in our inner consciousness, moving our minds to think and our mouths to speak. For there is a silence in this unmediated moment; a silence can only be thought when it has been mediated and we do have words, and in being thought is broken. It is a silence of accord and attunement—that we have been created in such a way that we can become aware the ‘wide earth’ is where we belong; as a beating part of an overwhelming extension. And we do belong, because we are part of the givenness of all things, part of the intricate organisation and balances that order and maintain what is given. There is also then a peace insofar as this is what feeling does and this is what life does, and one accords with and supports the other. I say peace and I do not intend quietism. The peace is not ours in ourselves, it is given to us and we receive the impress that that gift. The peace is from elsewhere and we enter it, actively, as we receive. For this is a primordial encounter between what Schleiermacher would describe as the intuited and the intuiter and what we find is that our givenness recognises the fore-givenness of all things and that we dwell here. There are two interrelated but different understandings of the suffix “for”. In “forethought” the suffix means “ahead” or “in front”—to think in advance in this case. But in Old English, where we get our verbs to give (\textit{griefan}) and to forgive (\textit{forgriefan}) from, the suffix “for” means “completely”—that which is completely given, given without either qualification or constraint;\textsuperscript{27} an absolute givenness that is both prior to and in advance of our

\textsuperscript{24} Hegel, \textit{Ethical Life}, 159.
\textsuperscript{25} Schleiermacher, \textit{On Religion}, 709.
\textsuperscript{26} Hegel, \textit{Ethical Life}, 167.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Forgriefan} means to grant, allow, or to give in marriage. The same affiliation, from the same Anglo-Saxon root, between to give and to forgive is found in German, with \textit{geben} and \textit{vergeben}. 
intuiting it. We find ourselves immersed in the “wide earth”, in its sheer gratuitousness, the wealth of its provision, and the effulgence of its grace.

This is what I mean by “the feeling I belong here”—that I too am given in this givenness. Given but not dissolved. I remain, as Hegel insisted, as that which is singular, particular. This feeling is always my feeling. In his early work, Schleiermacher comes close, if he does not fall into, a mystic fusion: “a Promethean deification of humankind and a Spinozistic deification of the universe.” And even Hegel points to a moment of union or rather, for him, unity, a primordial “indifference” which he equates with “enjoyment”: “This enjoyment in which the object is determined purely ideally, and entirely annihilated, is purely sensuous enjoyment, i.e., the satiation which is the restoration of the indifference and emptiness of the individual or of his bare possibility of being ethical and rational.” But, in an early fragment reported on and perhaps in the possession of Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel, perhaps in response to Schleiermacher, observes: “it is the essence of religion that the spirit is not ashamed of any of its individuals... The supercession of subjectivity is not the sheer nullification of it, but just the nullification of its empirical individuality, and by this means it is a purification for the absolute enjoyment of its [i.e., the spirit's] absolute essence. In another fragment dated around 1803-4, Hegel speaks of “absolute self-enjoyment” and seems to be suggesting, as in the quote found in Rosenkranz that this is the divine Trinitarian condition. Our own enjoyments (even the sensuous ones) are then glimpses and distant analogical participations in divine and absolute self-enjoyment or blessedness. If Hegel then, as he increasingly understands his own dialectical method, maintains separateness and defers union, Schleiermacher expresses a unifying moment in the original intuition that relates to his “mysticism”: “I lie on the bosom of the infinite world. I am in this moment its soul, for I feel its powers and its infinite life as I feel my own. In this moment it is my body, for I permeate its muscles and limbs as I do my own, and its innermost nerves, like my own, move in accordance with my

28 Blackwell, Schleiermacher's Early Philosophy, 207.
29 Hegel, Ethical Life, 105.
30 Rosenkrantz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben, 133.
31 Hegel, Ethical Life, 253.
sense and my presentiment." Nevertheless, for Schleiermacher, unlike the later development of his thought in Rudolph Otto, the self remains; even in its immersion. There is no union. It is this that Otto critiques in his own exposition of religious experience before that which is “holy.” For Otto, Schleiermacher articulates a consciousness of createdness, but he does not articulate what Otto views as prior to that - a consciousness of creaturehood. The consciousness of that creaturehood issues from an “annihilation of the self” and a consciousness of “its nullity.” For Otto there is first an overwhelming, ineffable, non-rational encounter in which the self is dissolved and only then recovers itself in a notion of the “wholly other.” This is not Schleiermacher’s position. And this is perhaps why Schleiermacher pays so much more attention to the body and its senses while, for all the talk of feeling and affect, Otto’s emphasis is upon the mind.

We can take something from each of these accounts. Hegel’s recognition of a fundamental “enjoyment” can be understood in terms of the body’s response to the divine reflection upon the conclusion of creation “God saw everything that he had made and indeed it was very good.” In enjoyment the object as such is ‘annihilated’. In a later account of such sensuous enjoyment, Hegel, pays

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34 It is difficult to see, in Otto, who wishes to retain the notion of dependence but articulate an experience more primordial to it, why an encounter with what is overpowering and absolutely ‘unapproachable’ (Otto, Idea of the Holy, 19) could ever give rise to the notion of dependence at all. In fact the encounter with the mysterium as described by Otto is more likely to issue in an account of the absolutely transcendent as the point of Indifference – much like Schelling’s notion of God. It is with this ‘wholly other’ that liberal theology begins, ironically. Ironically, insofar as Karl Barth thought he was recovering the ‘wholly other’ as a descriptor for God in order to save theology from liberalism But it is because, for Otto, God is ‘wholly other’ that “nothing can be predicated, but that which is absolutely and intrinsically other than and opposite of everything that is and can be thought” (Otto, Idea of the Holy, 29). And so Otto is led towards a nominalism that, for all his commitment to Christianity and its superiority to other religions, establishes the cult and scriptures of a particular religion so many sets of ‘ideograms’ naming the root and ultimate experience. So we find descriptions of the way the numinous attract and appropriates “meanings derived from social and individual ideals of obligation, justice, and goodness” (Otto, Idea of the Holy, 110) so that in this way this numinous is “filled with rational and ethical meaning” (Otto, Idea of the Holy, 109), but in and of itself the ineffability and total otherness of the numinous indicates its transcendent indifference to the creaturely. It is, as Otto remarks, “formally absolute” (Otto, Idea of the Holy, 145). Tillich, of course, takes this line of liberal theology much further.
attention to that which proceeds enjoyment; that is, desire. In the context of a phenomenology of sexual relations, he writes that “desire passes over into enjoyment.” But, at this point, where intuition is preconceptual and the other person has not yet entered the phenomenological frame, the enjoyment is not preceded by a conscious desire. Even so, in the annihilation that takes place, desire must be the dynamic. What is intuited in the givenness of all things is then attractive. Employing a more Platonic vocabulary what is good is also what is beautiful; and to be desired. It is the same dynamic evident in what we can take from Schleiermacher’s erotics. In German his description of lying on the bosom of the world is more evidently erotic because the world is die Welt, feminine. The origin intuition from which consciousness arises can be understood in terms of the primordial encounter in feeling and intuition as a marriage and a conjugal rite, a making of one flesh. But I am more hesitant to speak of union or fusion. I want to speak instead of “rest” as in Psalm 95.11—entering into his rest: God’s Sabbath satisfaction; a stillness that we must forever return to in which God is known. Or we might also speak of a condition like Mary’s in her conception: “full of grace.” “Rest” is the concomitant of “peace” I mentioned earlier. They are both eschatological concepts, but in the primordial intuition, which as Schleiermacher reminds us, tells us nothing about the things in themselves, we experience an intimation of the realisation of the eschaton. In that rest and that peace lies this “feeling that I belong”, that I dwell, of both accordance and distinction that makes possible both worship and ethical life. Again, “rest” illustrates how far we are from quietism; for quietism is not rest but resignation, an amor fati that we find announced in Spinoza and exalted in Nietzsche. In his early work, Schleiermacher sidles close to amor fati at time, but by the time we reach his mature work the feeling of absolute dependence is “devotional” in tone, developed more out of an examination of “piety” than “religion”; for “religion” is far too nebulous a term. “Piety” is expressive of the submission involved in this moment; a submission in awe, reverence and wonder. I take this is be what the Psalms describe as the ‘fear’ of the Lord—which is the source of wisdom. It is from this rest, which is not ours and a piety that is ours because it is our response to it, that dwelling comes and it is from that dwelling that worship arises. Worship because the final mediation of this feeling is an opening of the

36 Hegel, Ethical Life, 231.
lips and the showing forth of praise. As the Book of Common Prayer has it in both the morning and the evening liturgy: “Priest: O Lord, open thou our lips. Congregation: And our mouths shall shew forth they praise.” Prayer is born.

I’m going to have to leave the theological as a sketch—and I’m aware this leaves begging all sorts of questions about the relationship between these accounts of feeling and intuition and Christian theology and the way Schleiermacher and Hegel develop those accounts in quite distinctive ways. But we need to proceed to the neurobiology and neuropsychology of affect; the science of emotion as it has developed over the last fifteen years through the pioneering work of researchers like Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux, among many others. Because it is through them that we can understand more about the two theological emphases found in Schleiermacher and Hegel and approach what I would call a theology of experience rather than an account of ‘religious’ experience. In fact, there is no such things as ‘religious’ experience, as we shall see in engaging the work of neurobiologists and understanding more profoundly what is at stake in “feeling” and “intuition”; how, since emotion is always an urge to action, this feeling/intuition is related to both doing and knowing in a highly specific context; how what is involved in a theological emotion which, because the operations of God in the world are concerned with redemption, furthers the process of sanctification (and therefore treats sin and guilt). Now I have to be extremely brief here and considerably reductive but allow me to make a few important observations based on the science of emotions and the importance of the concrete environments in which emotion is invoked and responds.

Emotional Intelligence

Both Schleiermacher and Hegel recognise the preconscious character of the feeling of absolute dependence in piety and the intuition of God as Himself in His creation. We are treating here what has come to be known, after Daniel Goleman as ‘emotional intelligence’, much of which is pre- or even un-conscious. The registration of emotion begins with sensations that are communicated to the hypothalamus handling those sensations. This is seated deep in what is called the neocortex. I’ll explain why we call it ‘neo’ in a moment. But the neocortex
handles our rationalising operations. So the information is registered and analysed such that the objects sensed are perceived and understood; or, in the case of feelings, appraised and responded to appropriately. The neocortex orchestrates our control of emotional situations. Feeling delivered from the senses, at this point, is fairly low level and arrives as judgements like “the water’s hot”, “that’s tastes bitter”, “that’s soft and gentle”. Such feelings are conscious ones, on the whole; though the brain processes far more sensations than consciousness is aware of. Consciousness accounts for only a small fraction of what is going on as our bodies respond to their environments and the social communities to which they belong. Such feelings demand little or nothing in terms of an emotional response. But the feeling of absolute dependence in piety and the intuition of God in His creation is not such a low level feeling or even a feeling among other feelings. For this feeling must have a profound emotional impact, which also means a profound somatic impact, since the emotions are completely integrated into other brain features that regulate the body (muscle tone, heartbeat, blood pressure, perspiration etc.), the hormone system (releasing chemicals like adrenaline, adrenal steroids and peptides into the bloodstream and various behavioural actions (freezing, running, crying, facial expressions etc.). As I said, this is Gefühl not Eindruck or Empfindung. This is An-schauung, an inner vision or display; ‘inscape’ the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins would probably call it. It has a life-changing impact that energises conversion, repentance (metanoia), perhaps the apprehensions of fear, guilt and shame; it has the force of a profound and overwhelming revelation. There is an element also of surprise involved; surprised by joy. It has the power of a passion which floods the rational mind with emotion that cannot be controlled. More anatomically: Schleiermacher’s Gefühl and Hegel’s Anschauung “sabotage[e] the ability of the prefrontal lobe [in the neocortex] to maintain working memory.”

The working memory is a prefrontal system that enables us to attend to and recall all that is necessary for a task in hand. Some neuropsychologists believe the contents of our working memory are what we more generally understand as “consciousness.” Such emotions, which override the capacity of the prefrontal lobe (on the left side) to regulate, are related to a region of the brain known as the amygdala and the

37 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 30.
38 see LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 278-82.
The limbic realm.\textsuperscript{39} This is a much older part of the brain in terms of evolution; the root of the neocortex (neo because it is a ‘new’ development in the brain power of mammals). The amygdala is the seat of the passions, what neuroscientists concerned with the emotions have called the ‘basic emotions’—emotions learnt and stored in order to survive.

To be immersed in is to be vulnerable to the world; but to be vulnerable is also to be transformable. Neurobiological and neuropsychological scientists, who treat the passions and the processes of emotion, inform us that we are continually responding to the stimulations provided by our environments, though consciousness focuses its attention on certain stimuli and others are processed subconsciously (in the subcortical regions of the brain) or unconsciously. These responses can become emotional prior to being cognitions in the sense of conscious feelings and as such trigger somatic and endocrine activities through the autonomic nervous system. Not all sensations necessarily become emotions. What is actively picked up, even searched for, by the senses has to trigger an arousal for there to be an emotional experience. Environmental psychologist, JJ. Gibson, among others, regards the senses as aggressive mechanisms that actively detect and track down not just receive, again without necessarily engaging the intellectual process\textsuperscript{40}. When these sensations trigger arousals systems in the brain, since each system has a different chemical identity, then different neurotransmitters are released: acetylcholine, noradrenalin, dopamine and serotonin. All these chemicals are fundamental to establishing people’s moods. Acetylcholine is a chemical associated with the amygdala area of the brain—one of the oldest, in evolutionary terms, parts of the brain below the neocortex (which mediates our thinking and rational decision making). We will return to the amygdala in a moment, for now it is important to understand that the “informational content provided by arousal systems is weak… Arousal systems simply say that something important is going on.”\textsuperscript{41} Our most intense emotions, such as trauma, are related to acetylcholine and the amygdala system.

\textsuperscript{39} There has been much research conducted to whether there is a limbic system, but the current position seems to be that operations in the limbic realm do not constitute a system as such, but a series of independent relations.

\textsuperscript{40} See Gibson, \textit{The Senses}, 97-8.

\textsuperscript{41} LeDoux, \textit{The Emotional Brain}, 290-1.
which contains our innate and implicit memories. Activation of the amygdala by the sensory thalamus can connect with the neocortex region through the hippocampus (associated with long-term, explicit memory and cognition) and become conscious emotions, but can also take a much faster route by communicating directly. This “results in the automatic activation of networks that control the expression of responses… (Freezing, fighting, facial expressions), the autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses (changes in blood pressure and heart rate, piloerection, sweating), and the hormonal responses (release of hormones, like adrenaline, adrenal steroids, as well as a host of peptides, into the bloodstream.”

We literally have a “gut-reaction.” The different emotions can be associated, to some extent, with the different autonomic nervous system responses. Because this reaction by-passes the hippocampus and neocortex systems, which controls thinking, or only arrives at those systems later, then “we can attribute the arousal and bodily feelings to stimuli that are present in working memory. However, because the stimuli in working memory did not trigger the amygdala, the situation will be misdiagnosed.”

In ways which cross pollinate within psychoanalysis, neuroscientists like Joseph LeDoux, point to the unconscious as a repository for our basic emotional life and our emotional memories. Only a fraction of what goes on emotionally within us ever gets filtered through to conscious feeling in which we can identify “I am experiencing this or that.” “Feelings do involve conscious content, but we don’t necessarily have conscious access to the processes that produce that content. And even when we do have introspective access, the conscious content is not likely to be what triggered the emotional responses in the first place.”

We can, of course, reflect upon some of these emotional processes and, to some extent, ‘appraise’ these phenomena and name these feelings. To some extent we can also trace the causes for certain feelings, usually after the event. But not always: because the emotional processing is unconscious and has somatic affects prior to rational

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45 ‘Appraise’ here is a technical term (see Arnold, *Emotion and Personality*). The appraisal theorists, after Arnold, see that feelings involve a mediating ‘appraisal’ of the stimuli presented. Neuroscientists like LeDoux do not reject appraisal theorists but believe “appraisals occur unconsciously.” See LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, 52.
appreciation, then our ‘appraisals’ can be distorted—I think (cognitively) that I am angry, but on deeper reflection become aware that my anger is a reaction to a more primal fear. As to understanding their cause: because there is an emotional memory that is also mainly unconscious, and a somatic memory associated with the physiological affects of emotions, a present emotion can be associated with a forgotten or repressed stimulation. This was evidently a rich source for Freudian investigation, although more recently the psychophysiology of trauma had drawn attention to what Babette Rothschild has called “Expressions of trauma not yet remembered.” As she observes: “Every emotion is characterized by a discrete pattern of skeletal muscle contraction visible on the face and in body posture (somatic nervous system). Each emotion also feels different on the inside of the body. Different patterns of visceral muscle contractions are discernible as body sensation (the internal sense)… each emotion is the result of interplay between the sensory, autonomic, and somatic nervous systems interpreted within the brain’s cortex.”

Memory is needed to create emotion; it builds up a repository but it also temporalizes emotions—this is a past feeling, this is a present feeling. But some emotions, traumatic ones, can generate dissociation between the stimuli, the sensory, autonomic and somatic nervous systems. In the dissociation the processing of the emotion is stalled and can then resurface as a “flashback” or somatic symptoms that Freud associated with various forms of hysteria. And some emotional triggers are so deep there is never going to be a human possibility of accessing them. For unlike the Freudian unconsciousness, from which certain things can be retrieved and brought to consciousness—hence therapy is through the ‘speaking-cure’—the emotional memory of the amygdala, since it is not directly approachable through the cortex and is a separate system from the hippocampus, cannot be plumbed at all. LeDoux sums up: “Contrary to

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46 Rothschild, *Psychophysiology of Trauma*, 56.
47 see Nathanson, *Shame and Pride*.
48 The ‘automatic’ nervous system (often abbreviated in the literature to ANS) we have no control over. Its operations, with respect to muscle tone (relaxed, stressed) and visceral responses (for example, sexual arousal), is involuntary. It is regulated by the limbic system wherein our most protective and instincts and reflexes abide. The two other limbic systems are called the hippocampus and the amygdala and these process information between the body and the cerebral cortex.
the primary supposition of cognitive appraisal theories, the core of an emotion is not introspectively accessible to conscious representation."49

These cognitive scientists researching emotions and investigations into affect enable us to understand what is involved in an immersion in the world and the vulnerability of the self with respect to such an immersion. For emotions are always and only embodied. In ways more profound and more complex than thinking, “The body is crucial to emotional experience, either because it provides sensations that make an emotion feel a certain way right now or because it once provided the sensations that created memories of what specific emotions felt like in the past.”50 It involves not simply an openness to what is around us materially, socially, culturally, political and economically—and all the complex experiences generated by such an openness—it also involves coming to terms with our own responses to all this stimulation. This “coming to terms” includes somatic and cognitive processing, understanding and managing our responses. And this goes on at the emotional level in much more complex ways than the rational. The task of processing, understanding and management in the face of those older primitive emotions—the so-called basic emotions, even if they were all open access to our ruminations, can be overwhelming, and would be overwhelming were it not for the grace of God. But what is evident is that such affections are not abstract and generic in the way “religion” is abstract and generic. They are embodied and contextual engagements of embodiment. And there is no transcending that embodiment and contextuality. If these emotions are experienced within a tradition of piety then they can only be theological experiences, not ‘religious’ experiences. Lawrence Durrell ends the first part of his The Alexandria Quartet (‘Justine’) with the observation: “Does not everything depend on our interpretation of the silence around us?”51 And he is right, but the silence is not some universal nihil; it is the silence of a material moment and a material place and a material circumstance.

There is still much debate concerning which emotions are primary and basic. Paul Eckman, whose research underpinned much of Daniel Goleman’s influential

49 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 299.
50 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 298.
study Emotional Intelligence lists six based upon the universal recognition of facial expressions: surprise, happiness, anger, fear, disgust and sadness. An earlier study by Jaak Panskepp, on the basis of findings from stimulating areas in the brains of rats, came up with four: panic, rage, expectancy, fear. LeDoux concludes: “many if not most of the lists include some version of fear, anger, disgust, and joy. Most of the remaining disagreement is over the fringe cases, like interest, desire and surprise.” It is not that with the development of the neocortex there is the acquiring of certain control management for these emotions, but as I said above, these emotions can by-pass the hippocampus and its relation of cognition and memory: “the connections from the cortical areas to the amygdala are far weaker than the connections from the amygdala to the cortex. This may explain why it is so easy for emotional information to invade our conscious thoughts, but so hard for us to gain conscious control over our emotions.” But, as I said, theologically we understand that we are not alone in such a situation. Our immersion in the world is unavoidable, but it is a participation in Christ’s immersion in the world. Only as such is the immersion bearable; only insofar as Christ as the pioneer of our faith has borne all things and brought all things in submission to him, can we possible bear the suffering of this immersion. And “suffering” here bears its older sense of “allowing things to be”; for the immersion need not be an entry into what is painful–joy, happiness and pleasure are among our basic emotions. Augustine puts in succinctly: “molestias et difficultates… tolerari iubes ea” [You command [that we] endure troubles and difficulties]. In an interesting commentary, which opens up a profound meditation on being human before God, Heidegger writes: “The tolerare circumscribes a peculiar complex of enactment which is not operative in isolation, but which moves in a characteristic and fundamental direction of factual life.” Not the avoidance, but the entry more deeply into, the maintenance of an openness to allow, tolerate, endure, is the direction not only

52 See Ekman, ‘Facial Expression.’
53 Panskepp, ‘Theory of Emotions.’
54 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 121.
55 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 265.
56 Augustine, Confessiones, 148-9.
57 Heidegger, Phenomenology of Religious Life, 152.
of Augustine’s mediation in Book X of *Confessions*, it is also the direction of an immersion into the glorification of all things in Christ. We may suffer sorely the complexity of human affairs, their consequences in terms of structural sin, and their affects in terms of violence, addiction, the aggressive pursuit of self-interest, indifference, jealousy etc... We may also suffer the world as lit up by the grace of God, His love for us, His mercy towards us, His eternal offer of forgiveness, His work of reconciliation and salvation. But, in all things, to be immersed in the world, to be vulnerable in such an immersion, is to be open to suffer in this older sense. To follow in the wake of the incarnate one is to participate in the radical nature of that incarnation which took upon itself both our flesh, blood, passions and experience and the sins of the whole world. But we cannot “bear all things” in the way Christ “bore all things” without a spiritual pedagogy—where spiritual engages both the corporeal and the intellectual.58 This is a discipleship in His love. We cannot “bear all things” without having learnt how to pray without ceasing. To pray without ceasing is to recognize prayer at the level of the body as well as the mind. Because, in any stretch of time the mind is preoccupied with the activities with which it is involved, and not conscious of a ceaseless interceding. To pray without ceasing is to recognize that the body too has its own knowledge and intentionality that may or may not be attuned with what the mind, the body and the “guts” are thinking. As Daniel Goleman points out, evolution has given emotions an important and central role in the human condition; “our deepest feelings, passions and longing are essential guides.”59 To pray without ceasing then is not to eschew the corporeal and emotional but to embrace them and discipline them; to cultivate the right passions which inform and transform the soul and are informed and transformed by the soul. Only in prayer can there be that attention to the world that is concomitant with an immersion that is sensory, somatic, cognitive and spiritual. This praying requires a discipline, a work, a laboring in love that opens us to an infinite responsibility. It is necessitates a learning how not to be defensive, how not to be fearful, and

58 I would distinguish our contemporary understanding of mind, which from Descartes onwards has become synonymous with consciousness, from soul which embraces corporeal sense, emotional memory and processing and intellectual endeavour. The soul is both consciousness and pre-consciousness. It is a field of operations that are cognitive, somatic and spiritual – where spirit is both the life within and given to us as a gift and the life of God operating in and through Christ in creation.

how to let go. It requires the development of what Heidegger saw as a fundamental aspect of Dasein, *Sorge* or care. But is care without the worry, fear and anxiety that is often associated with that passion. This learning in the way of love—a love in which there is no fear, no defensiveness, no self-protective reaction to what is given is, to some extent, an undoing of our evolutionary biologies. As we have evolved, we have adapted to conditions in ways that ensure our survival as a species. In this adaptation is instilled a fear of death and a need to protect ourselves. Food, shelter and procreation will ensure that survival.

**Conclusion**

What I am suggesting here is that learning the way of Christian love—which is learnt always under the guidance of the Holy Spirit—physiologically will and must affect the operation of the limbic realm; that oldest part of the brain associated with the amygdala. This learning will and must engender a biological transformation in our survival instincts and reflexes; even if, for us human subjects, there is no conscious access to such areas of our emotional memory unless things are revealed to us in prayer. For in the limbic system lies our *libido dominandi* and our *amor sui*. The two (im)moral dispositions that Augustine emphasizes are at the root of evil. Both emotional drives, rooted in the urge to self-protection are related to the same illusion: our invulnerability. As Goleman observes, for most of us “our mental well-being is based in part on the illusion of invulnerability”\(^60\). It is an illusion which has to be shattered; it is an illusion at the antipodes of Schleiermacher’s recognition that piety rests upon the feeling of absolute dependence. As Schleiermacher recognized, and developed in his ethics, this feeling of absolute dependence in worship, as piety, is an intimation of our primordial relational condition which constitutes the given, the gift. In the limbic realm lie the primeval and early childhood emotional memories that reinforce the innate and preconditioned fear and anger that makes us fight for our lives at all costs—rather than lay them down. Self-sacrifice, kenosis and martyrdom as

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\(^{60}\) Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, 189.
acts of love all evidence structural transformations to these survivor instincts in
the limbic realm; they evidence a distinction has been and can be made between
emotional reactions, which are always an impulse to act, and deliberative actions;
and they evidence degrees of conscious control of the emotional. We may never
know (how could we?) whether there is a purging of the emotional memories in
the amygdala that takes place in and through sanctification, but there will
certainly be what Daniel Goleman describes as “an inhibition of the limbic
signals to the motor cortex”.  

If we take the core commandment cited by Jesus to the rich young Pharisee,
then we observe that we “should love the Lord your God with all your heart and
with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind”.  

It is, of
course, an injunction laid down in Deuteronomy; it has an ancient provenance
and encapsulates an ancient wisdom. All we have been examining above
concerns love as an affect, an emotion registered in and issuing from deep within
the heart and the soul. It concerns the body, its energies and musculature –
”strength” is an emotional, psychological and physiological phenomenon.
Strength also relates to the will and that faculty is inseparable from the ‘mind’.
Cognition plays an important function in the fulfilling of this commandment. But
cognition cannot operate alone, and its deeper currents lie within the body and
its affections and the soul. The grace to fulfill his core injunction affects the
totality of who we are as human beings, and in keeping this commandment lies
our salvation. And not only our salvation, but also the salvation of the
communities to which we belong. Ethical life begins with this change of heart
and its orientation towards loving God fully. To be obedient to a set of rules that
we recognize as a civil or even a religious code is only to be obedient to what is
in our minds. It is head rather than heart knowledge. Heart knowledge knows
that the rules are only a guide; the following is the most important aspect—and
following is an affective, corporeal and therefore matter of the soul and the spirit.

In conclusion, let me be clear on two issues here: first, the limbic system is
not evil or the seat of evil. I am no advocate of that now outdating method of
dealing with aggressive forms of emotional instability, lobotomy. The limbic

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system is also the home all other communications between the body and the cerebral cortex—it enables us to love with all our heart, mind and strength. It is also the source of guilt, shame, compassion and mercy. Two lobes, one on the right side of the brain, the hippocampus, the other on the left, the amygdala, are processing information which enables us to feel, know and act. But consider that founding story of sin in the Book of Genesis: Adam and Eve eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Before this they had existed, according to the story, in a state of freedom and joy prior to fear, to anger, and to jealousy. With all things had they been provided – food, water, companionship, work to do—in harmony with the rest of creation that they were given the task of governing. Okay it is a fairly limited range of emotions that the thin details of the story give us, and I am not trying to integrate the poetic imagination concerning the beginning of things with contemporary evolutionary psychology. But, it is interesting that, following the eating of the fruit from the forbidden tree, strong emotions do surface that neuroscientists associate with the amygdala and primitive emotional memory. The first is fear: when the voice of God calls Adam in the garden Adam ran, hid and froze (the fundamental somatic actions associated with fear). “I heard your voice in the garden and I was afraid,” Adam tells God. He is afraid, he says, because he realizes his nakedness—his utter vulnerability before what is now a threatening other. The second emotion is shame—so God provides them with clothes to cover their nakedness. Shame is a primitive emotion associated with guilt. The third emotion is sorrow and pain: “I will greatly multiply your sorrow and your conception; in sorrow shall you bring forth children.” And the final emotion is the libido dominandi: “your desire shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you.” All these emotions are also accompanied by now by death; for Adam and Eve will now live and labor until they return to the ground from where they were taken. The rest, one might say is history—human history. But what is it we pray for when we recite the words of the prayer Jesus taught His disciples “deliver us from evil”? Is our redemption and sanctification associated with the excision of those negative basic emotions? In the resurrection of the body will we find we have a new emotional life freed from the fear, shame, sorrow and lust because disciplined in and by love?

The second point on which I wish to be clear concerns prayer; prayer as the condition in which our sanctification is established, our vulnerability extended
and our attunement to being absolutely dependent apprehended (felt and intuited in Schleiermacher’s and early Hegel’s understanding of these terms). In this advocacy for the role of prayer I am not acquiescing to quietism. It is actually a thinking with the material world, the material world given to us, a world in which God operates in Christ, through the Spirit. This prayer is an obedience, a service that is both action and passivity, giving and receiving, responsibility and response; it both patience and endeavor. As I stated and examined in The Politics of Discipleship, prayer is our most political act\(^63\): a participation in the mind of Christ written into all of creation—a mind that infuses all things with the task of communicating each to the other (even so-called “inanimate” things like Robinson Jeffers’ “Mysticism of stone.”\(^64\)

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